Husserl’s Phenomenology

“Phenomenology is a way of doing philosophy, a system by which things can be scrutinized by consciousness in order to ascertain their essential and necessary characteristics” (page 51). Husserl wanted to establish a phenomenological foundation for the natural and human sciences by providing a methodology based upon principles of absolutely verifiable foundations of the immediate, conscious experience. In a sense, taking away preconceived notions was a better way to accept and understand the present. By removing predetermined assumptions, this philosophical method would “purify”, allowing the structure of science to be accompanied by the “means by which to examine the roots of all knowledge” (page 51). The pitfalls of pyschologism were due to man’s subjective mind and his inability to leave presumptions behind.

Empirical realism is better examined if there is “focus on the things of consciousness rather than consciousness itself” (page 52). Only when one is aware of one’s consciousness can self-awareness be achieved. Assuming that consciousness is active, only then can it affect that which involves the “non-self”. Alternatively, something is only given meaning if it is engaged by the conscious. Husserl believed that in order to better understand noema—things that are intended by consciousness—we must remove previous biases in order to better secure knowledge using phenomenological methods.

Husserl and Kant have similar philosophies in that they are both centered on the conscious and the real world that exists uncontrolled outside of the conscious. Husserl’s phenomenological intent is to “provide uncolored, unbiased and systematic descriptions of the objects of experience without resorting to either of the theoretical positions of realism or idealism” (page 60). We expect that our perception of objects will be the same over time because we maintain that objects will retain the same physical consistency and “protentions” (future anticipations) because our conscious holds the same past “retentions” (past memories). Husserl focuses on the present tense because characteristics of time in his philosophy stem from the present.

By providing “a complete science, with its own foundations and presumptions grounded in the absolute self evidence of perception” (page 63), Husserl believed that this would provide analytical certainty. He began by using two stages of phenomenological reduction: transcendental and eidetic. The first stage requires a transformation from ordinary thought to that of the phenomenological. In ordinary thought, one sees an object literally and for what it is. Switching to phenomenological changes the point of view, one sees the object as it perceives itself. “This shift results in an examination of the directedness of consciousness” (page 64).

In order to better analyze, we turn inward to our conscious, disposing of any assumptions we may carry with us from any “retentions” or “protentions”. During “transcendental reduction”, also called epoche, “both the reality of the world and the subject are put into brackets or momentarily suspended” (page 65). This does not intend to remove their existence but is to temporarily pause any questions regarding their existence. In order to elucidate the second stage of epoche—defining central structures and relationships—eidos, an objects essence, is mentioned. This is done to discover universal knowledge about the objects and clarify what is secondary and what is essential to an object’s structure.

Husserl’s later phenomenology discusses “objectivity”, which can only be a factor if it applies to an object for everyone. In Husserl’s mind, there is only one “I”, everything outside is considered an “Other”, otherwise referred to as solipsism. He tries to balance between the “I”, a phenomenological reduction of the world and the “objectivity and reality of the Other” (page 75). Man brings “meaning” to the world through art, music, dance, books—things which don’t necessarily have any importance in the natural world (to animals, trees, flowers)—thus giving it significance. Ultimately, he fails his attempts to overcome psychologism and give structure to his phenomenology. It is impossible to assume a transparent ego when we sue language to communicate; language is already accompanied by basic, hidden biases. Inevitably, Husserl cannot accomplish the goals he set for himself because of inherent biases.

I think the most compelling discussion in this chapter is with regard to the concept of time. In Husserl’s philosophy, the main component is the motion of time and its effect on the conscious. The same question applies to the current state of music, because there is confusion about where music is going and confusion about how much of the past can apply. If Husserl is correct, and past and future concepts stem from the present, then are we holding on too tightly to the past without a firm enough grasp on the future? We are supposed to release retentions and protentions in order to better understand our current situation, but I think we’ve lost our grip on the accepted standards.

Since man is the reason why music (and other forms of art) exists at all, does that change its significance? It is difficult to question the idea of significance, because by doing so we are losing our objectivity. And it is hardly possible to categorize and systematize music on a theoretical and conceptual plane, so how are we supposed to determine what is secondary and what is essential? Ultimately, this should all show how past gestures and future endeavors could bring us closer to setting the criterion for the present.

(all photos in this post are taken from: http://nl.ijs.si/~damjan/phen.html)